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ABSTRACT
Android is the most widely used smartphone OS with 82.8%
market share in 2015 [1]. It is therefore the most widely tar-
geted system by malware authors. To detect these malicious
applications before they are installed on users phones, we
need an automated analysis. Researchers rely on dynamic
analysis to extract malware behaviors and often use emula-
tors to do so. However, using emulators lead to new issues.
Currently emulators cannot emulate SIM card, camera and
microphone - components that are likely to be used by mal-
ware applications. Moreover, malware may detect emulation
and as a result it does not execute the payload to prevent
the analysis. Finally, emulation suffers from inherent slow-
ness and causes more application crashes than real devices.
Dealing with virtual device evasion is a never-ending war
and comes with a non-negligible computation cost [2]. To
overcome this state of affairs, we propose a system that does
not use virtual devices for analysing malware behavior.
Glassbox is a functional prototype for the dynamic anal-
ysis of malware applications. It executes applications on
real devices in a monitored and controlled environment. It
is a fully automated system that installs, tests and extracts
features from the application for further analysis. The envi-
ronment is controlled in a way that Glassbox neither suffers
from malware nor becomes an infection vector through the
control of web requests, calls and SMS/MMS. The features
extracted are Java calls, system calls and both encrypted
and non encrypted web requests. In this paper, we present
the architecture of the platform and we compare it with ex-
isting Android dynamic analysis platforms.
Lastly, we evaluate the capacity of Glassbox to trigger
application behaviors by measuring the average coverage of
basic blocks on the AndroCoverage dataset [3]. We show
that it executes on average 13.52% more basic blocks than
the Monkey program.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Google reacted to the rise of malware with a dynamic
analysis platform, named Bouncer [4], that analyzes appli-
cations before the release on Google Play. This security
model is centralized and acts before the distribution of ap-
plications. Whereas this system suffers from limitations -
like virtual device evasion - it has helped to reduce the mal-
ware invasion about 40% [4].
Android antivirus companies use another centralized secu-
rity model which acts after the distribution of applications.
Because applications have access to restricted resources and
permissions, antivirus programs cannot perform their anal-
ysis - as it often requires root permissions and extensive
resources. Hence, the static analysis is externalized onto the
company servers. As a result, it can give quick responses -
each application being analyzed just once. This is a shift of
security model for the common user toward centralization.
Users have been used to personal antivirus for their per-
sonal computer. This security model does not allow much
room for manoeuvre because any antivirus needs to be quick
enough for not bothering the user - otherwise another quicker
antivirus will be chosen. Whereas antivirus have imple-
mented heuristic algorithms, they are rather limited by the
security model. Hence, the security model shifting is an op-
portunity for building more complex systems that require
more resources to run. It enables security systems to use
advanced research techniques like behavioral detection with
dynamic analysis, or detection with features similarity from
static analysis.
Malware authors made their strategy evolve with the rise
of Bouncer and other dynamic analysis systems. They have
started to hide the payload execution with emulation de-
tection or/and the requirement of an user interaction. For
example the reverse of the sample [5] shows that malware are
using emulation evasion. Emulators settings can be modi-
fied to mimic the appearance of a real device but there are
lots of ways of detecting Android emulation. Actually the
tool Morpheus [6] proves us this war is already lost as the
authors found around 10 000 heuristics to detect Android
emulation. So trying to modify the emulator to look real
is probably a waste of time. In such condition, we need to
redefine the problematic.
This is why we are presenting Glassbox, a dynamic anal-
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ysis platform for Android malware applications on real de-
vices. Glassbox is an environment for the controlled execu-
tion of applications, where the Android OS and the network
are monitored and have the capacity to block some actions
of the analyzed application. This environment is paired with
Smart Monkey, a program that automates the installation,
the testing of applications and the cleaning of the environ-
ment afterwards. The objective of Glassbox is to collect
features for machine learning algorithm, to classify applica-
tions as malware or as benign. In the following sections we
will present the related work about dynamic analysis sys-
tems, we will expose the architecture of both Glassbox and
Smart Monkey. Finally, we will present the average cover-
age of basic blocks of Smart Monkey on the AndroCoverage
Dataset [3].
2. RELATED WORK
Such dynamic analysis systems started being designed since
2010 [7] by the academic research, to circumvent the limita-
tions of static analysis - namely, code morphism and obfus-
cation. Since that time, many systems have been released.
For this study we have built a classification of a part of these
systems, presented in Figure 1 and Figure 2. The classifi-
cation takes into account three categories : the dynamic
features collected by the analysis, the strategies set in order
to automate application testing and finally the use of real
devices in dynamic analysis systems history. We discuss the
results on the following sub-sections.
2.1 Features Analyzed
Since the rise of Android dynamic analysis systems, the
use of system calls have been the leading approach. System
calls are the functions of the kernel space, available to the
user space. It gives the capacity to manipulate hard drive
files or to control processes. System calls can describe a pro-
gram behaviors, from a low level perspective. The retrieval
of those calls can be achieved in two ways, mainly:
• Virtual Machine Introspection - This is a tech-
nique available for emulators, which enables the host
to monitor the guest. It cannot be detected by the
guest since it is out of its reach and it is therefore
convenient for security analysis. Andrubis [2], Copper-
Droid [14] and DroidScope [10] take advantage of VMI
to retrieve, unseen by the target malware, all systems
calls done by the guest Android virtual machine.
• Strace/ptrace - Strace is a Linux utility for debug-
ging processes. It can monitor system calls, signal de-
liveries and changes of process state. Strace use the
ptrace system call to monitor another process memory
and registers. This second method is by far the sim-
plest and the most straightforward one as the only task
here is the automation of the strace execution. More-
over, it targets directly the system calls of the appli-
cation we need to. That is why this method has been
adopted in most of the literature, namely Crowdroid
[8], HADM [15], Maline [16] and [13]. We have also
chosen to use the strace utility for system calls moni-
toring. Despite the theoretical possibility of a malware
to detect that it is being debugged, we found no evi-
dence about this.
System calls seem to give great results for classification. Ma-
line reported 96% accuracy rate and HADM 87.3% both
with syscalls frequencies only. Actually syscalls capture low
level behaviors of both Java code and native code.
The second most collected feature is taint tracking infor-
mation as it reveals data leakage. It works by the instrumen-
tation of the Dalvik VM interpreter. The information we do
not want to leak is called a source. Some source of personal
data are tainted, like the phone number or the contacts list.
Each time a tainted source or value is used in a method
call, the DVM interpreter taints the returned value. With
this simple mechanism, we can observe the propagation of
the tainted information regardless of its transformations. A
function that enable to transmit an information outside of
the system is called a sink, like network requests or SMS.
If a tainted value is used in a sink, it means data source
has leaked. It enables to detect data leakage even if this
data have been ciphered or encoded. An application that
leaks data is not necessarily a malware, as data leakage is
the business of both malware and user tracking frameworks
in commercial applications - which constitutes essentially a
large part of ”goodware” applications. Whereas this feature
gives useful insights on the application behaviors for manual
analysis, its utility for automatic malware detection needs
to be proved. Moreover the implementation and execution
of taint tracking is costly, which leads us not to choose this
feature for now.
Java calls is another feature of interest as it captures an
explicit behavior of the application. There are several ways
to collect them:
• Application instrumentation - This strategy does
not need any modification of the Android source code
and is not dependent on Android version. The applica-
tion can be modified in order to dump targeted method
parameters and return values. APImonitor [18] is a
tool that enables the instrumentation of targeted Java
calls. It reverses the application into smali, a human
friendly format equivalent to the Java bytecode, with
the baksmali [19] utility. Then, it adds monitor rou-
tines around the targeted calls and it recompiles the
code with the smali [19] utility. This strategy is used
by the authors of [13].
• DVM/ART instrumentation - The DVM (Dalvik
Virtual Machine) or ART (Android RunTime, An-
droid API version ≥ 4.4) is the system that interprets
and executes all the application instructions. All Java
calls converge to this component. Hence, by hooking
the execution of DVM/ART, one can monitor and con-
trol all Java calls, their arguments and their return val-
ues. That implies the modification of Android source
code and its compilation to a custom ROM. This is the
strategy we chose to use for collecting Java calls. We
prefer this method for keeping the application behav-
iors pristine, and particularly not inducing additional
bugs. Andrubis [2] and DroidScope [10] use similar
approaches for tracing method calls.
For the last features, they are highly marginal. Here, An-
drubis reported the retrieval of targeted shared library calls.
Another data are the network communications. Only An-
drubis reported the utilization of features from network com-
munications, but without any further details. Our system
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Figure 1: Comparative state of the art of dynamic analysis systems.
Reference Tool name Dynamic features used App testing strategies Objectives & comments
Thomas Bla¨sing
et al. 2010
[7]
AASandbox System calls (name) Monkey
Data for malware/benign
classification
# Virtual device
Iker Burguera
et al. 2011
[8]
Crowdroid System calls (name) Crowdsourced app interactions
Data for malware/benign
classification
# Real device
Cong Zheng
et al. 2012
[9]
SmartDroid Taint tracking, +?
UI brute force
Restriction of execution
to targeted activities
Data for classification
or manual analysis
# Virtual device
Lok Kwong Yan
et al. 2012
[10]
DroidScope
System call (all content)
Java calls (all content)
Taint tracking
-
Data for classification
or manual analysis
# Virtual device
Vaibhav Rastogi
et al. 2013
[11]
AppsPlayground
Taint tracking
Targeted Android API Java calls
Monkey
UI brute force
Broadcast events
Text fields filling
Malware/benign classification
# Virtual device
Martina Lindorfer
et al. 2014
[2]
Andrubis
App Java calls (all content)
System calls (name, +?)
Shared libraries targeted calls
(name, +?)
Taint tracking
DNS/HTTP/FTP/SMTP/IRC
(all content)
Monkey
Broadcast events
All possible app services
All possible app activities
Data for classification
or manual analysis
# Virtual device
Mingyuan Xia
et al. 2015
[12]
AppAudit Taint tracking ∼
Malware/benign classification
Data leaks detector
# Symbolic execution
Vitor Monte Afonso
et al. 2014
[13]
-
Targeted Android API Java calls
(name)
System calls (name)
Monkey
Broadcast events
Malware/benign classification
96.66% accuracy
# Virtual device
Kimberly Tam
et al. 2015
[14]
CopperDroid
System calls (all content)
Binder data
Broadcast events
Text fields filling, +?
Data for classification
or manual analysis
# Virtual device
Lifan Xu
et al. 2016
[15]
HADM System call (name)
Monkey
Broadcast events
Malware/benign classification
87.3% accuracy
# Virtual device
Marko Dimjasˇevic´
et al. 2016
[16]
Maline System call (name)
Monkey
Broadcast events
Malware/benign classification
96% accuracy
# Virtual device
Michelle Y. Wong
et al. 2016
[17]
IntelliDroid Taint tracking
Targeted inputs leading to
suspicious Android API calls
Data for classification
or manual analysis
# Virtual device
- Glassbox
Java calls (name)
System calls (name)
HTTP/HTTPS requests
(all content)
Monkey
UI brute force
Broadcast events
Real SMS/Call
Text fields filling
Data for malware/benign
classification
# Real device
Figure 2: Comparative state of the art of dynamic analysis systems - legend.
+?
The paper is not clear enough on those details
and we cannot be sure that it is an exhaustive list
call (name) Only the name of the call is used, in order to get the appearance frequency
# Comment
- No data
∼ Data exists but is irrelevant for this study
Note on the difference between data for classification and simply classification on the objectives column:
Many papers, as ours, only present the dynamical analysis system but do not present an analysis of the results on collected features. This can
be posponed for another paper or made by other researchers. For this kind of papers, the objective of the system presented is to produce data
for classification. For the other ones the data is used on a classification algorithm and the results are presented in the paper.
makes use of Panoptes [20] for gathering plain text and en-
crypted web communications, the process will be described
in the Network control & monitoring part.
2.2 Automated Testing Strategies
Dynamic analysis does not consist of launching the appli-
cation and waiting the malware to show its malicious be-
haviors off. Malware are using logic bombs for hiding the
payload. Logic bombs are a malicious piece of code that is
executed after a condition is triggered. It means we need to
test each application as a real user could have done it. For
achieving this objective, several strategies have been used in
the past:
• Black Box testing strategies - This class of strate-
gies does not take the application source code into
account, it focuses on sending inputs in the applica-
tion without any prior information. This is the com-
monly used strategy. Monkey [21] is a dedicated tool
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created by Google for this task. It generates random
events in a fast pace. Events range from system events
(home/wifi/bluetooth/sound volume etc.) to naviga-
tion events (motion, click). Because of its capacity
to quickly explore applications activities, it has been
used by most of dynamic analysis systems (AASandbox
[7], AppsPlayground [11], Andrubis [2], [13], HADM
[15], Maline [16]). Monkey is sometimes confused with
Monkey Runner [22] in the literature, which is a python
library for writing Android test routines.
• White Box testing strategies - This class of strate-
gies takes the application source code into account. It
focuses on sending specific inputs in the application
for triggering targeted code paths. It requires the in-
formation from the static analysis of the application.
Parsing the code is needed, to find the target methods
and all their triggering conditions. SmartDroid [9] and
IntelliDroid [17] determine all paths to sensitive API
calls, then execute one of the paths to the target with
dynamic analysis. Another kind of White Box testing
strategy is symbolic execution where dynamic analysis
is done by simulating the execution of the application
static code. AppAudit [12] uses this technique for find-
ing data leaks with symbolic taint tracking.
• Grey Box testing strategies - This class of strate-
gies partially takes the applications source code into
account. It focuses on testing all visible inputs the
application declares or displays (UI). It usually takes
the output of the application to generate the next in-
puts. Andrubis uses a Grey Box strategy when it tests
all possible application services and activities, because
they get the information from the application mani-
fest. AppsPlayground also uses Grey Box testing with
its Intelligent Execution where windows, widgets, and
objects are uniquely identified to know when an object
has already been explored. We use a similar strategy
in Glassbox.
2.3 Real Devices
The use of real devices for dynamic analysis started with
Crowdroid [8], a crowdsourced based analysis. Whereas this
approach give good results, one cannot ask users to execute
real malware on their personal device. So this system can
only be an option, when we have already a trained machine
learning algorithm, to find malware in the wild.
BareDroid is a system which manages real devices in large
scale for dynamical analysis. Whereas BareDroid [23] can-
not be considered as a dynamical analysis system, because
it does not analyse applications, it brought two major re-
sults for our study. First, real devices for dynamic analysis
systems are a scalable solution financially and in excution
time compared to virtual devices. Second, using real devices
drastically improves features detected for malware families
that often rely on emulator evasion like Android.HeHe, An-
droid Pincer, and OBAD.
3. ARCHITECTURE OVERVIEW
Glassbox (Figure 3) is a modular system distributed among
one or several phones and a computer. Each part is detailed
in the following sections.
3.1 Android Instrumentation
A custom Android OS has been made, based on the An-
droid Open Source Project (AOSP) [27]. The objective here
is to log dynamically each Java call of a targeted applica-
tion. This involves hooking these calls, at a point where
all of them pass through. We instrumented ART (Android
RunTime) [28], the Android managed runtime system that
executes application instructions. With the default parame-
ters, we found that ART (at least until Android Marshmal-
low) have the following important behaviors for our study:
• The first time Android is launched, Java Android API
libraries and applications are optimized and compiled
to a native code format called OAT [29].
• Each time a new application is installed, it is optimized
and compiled to OAT format.
• Java methods can be executed in three ways: by an
OAT JUMP instruction to the method address, by
the ART interpreter for non-compiled methods (de-
bugging purposes mostly), or via the Binder for invok-
ing a method from another process or with Java Re-
flection. Details on the Android Binder can be found
in [30] chapter 4.
A straightforward way of hooking Java calls is to instrument
the ART interpreter. Unfortunately only a few calls are ex-
ecuted through it because most of the code is compiled into
OAT and therefore it is not interpreted. We forced all calls
to be interpreted by disabling several optimizations. The
first one is the disabling of the compilation to OAT. That
leads calls to be interpreted before executed. But others
optimizations mechanisms comes into play, namely direct
branching and inlining.
The boot classpath contains the Android framework (Fig-
ure 4) and core libraries. They are always compiled in OAT
resulting in a boot.oat file. This file is mapped into mem-
ory by the Zygote process, started at the initialisation of
Android. For launching an application, the main activity
is given at Zygote in parameters. When Zygote is called
that way, it forks and starts the given activity. It means
that any application has access to same instance of the An-
droid framework and core libraries. Direct branching is an
optimisation that replaces framework/core method calls by
their actual address in memory. So the calls does not pass
through the interpreter. That optimisation is disabled.
Then inlining is an optimisation that replaces short and
frequently used methods with their actual code. Although,
it slightly increases the application size in memory, runtime
performance are increased. As there is no method any more,
it cannot be hooked in the ART interpreter. That optimi-
sation is also disabled.
A monitoring routine is added to ART interpreter that
logs any method call from a targeted application pid. A
sample of a capture of Java calls is shown in annexes. All
these modifications overload the global execution of Android.
Whereas it is not noticeable for most of the applications, on
gaming applications are visibly slow down by this approach.
Lastly the phone is shipped with a real SIM card for lur-
ing malware payloads with SMS/MMS/Calls. Many mal-
ware may use it for stealing money with premium numbers,
and because we use a real SIM card it would actually cost
us money. We modified the telephony framework of the An-
droid API to reject all outgoing communications except for
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Figure 3: Glassbox - Architecture overview.
our own phone number. When a forbidden call is made, the
calling UI pops and closes after one second around. This
way does not crash applications that rely on calls and SMS.
3.2 Network Control & Monitoring
All communications of the instrumented phone pass through
a transparent SSL/TLS interception proxy behind a wifi ac-
cess point. This is set by Panoptes [20]. To understand how
it works we need to describe a part of the TLS handshake.
Here is the regular behavior of a https request on Android :
Android have a keystore of all root certificates the sys-
tem trusts. When a SSL/TLS request is initialized, the
requested server send its certificate. It contains identifying
informations - like the domain name that must verify the
contacted domain name - and a signature that can only be
decrypted with the right root CA. The server certificate is
tested with each trusted root CA, and if one matches the
communication is accepted. Extended information on the
TLS handshake can be found with the RFC 2246 memo
[31].
For our interception system to work, a SSL/TLS root cer-
tificate from a custom certification authority (CA) is im-
planted in the keystore of Android. When the device re-
quests a https web page, the request goes through the proxy.
It is parsed and a new one is initialised to be sent to the
original recipient. The response is encapsulated in a new
5
Figure 4: Android architecture overview
SSL/TLS response signed by our custom certificate. This
custom certificate is dynamically generated with the recipi-
ent identifying informations and our custom root CA private
key. As the communication is signed by an authority of cer-
tification that is known by the client, Android accepts it
without any warning. Finally, all HTTP/HTTPS commu-
nications are logged and a report can be generated which is
convenient for manual analysis if needed.
This system has been extended to support manipulation
of requests. The objective is to restrict the proliferation of
malware and the damage that it may produce. As Glassbox
runs malware, it may have a negative impact on its environ-
ment. An extreme mean could be to disconnect the system
from internet but we would see less or no malicious behavior
at all for numerous applications. Our design is a trade-off
between safety and behavior detection:
• ClamAV [24] is used to detect known malware sent
through network. If a malware is detected, the pay-
load is removed from the request and is redirected to
Inetsim [26], a network services simulation server that
replies consistently to the requests. It forbids the com-
munication between the application and internet with-
out crashing it.
• For all other requests, we assess the reputation of the
domain name or IP address with the Web of Trust
(WoT) [25] API. WoT is a browser extension that fil-
ters urls based on different reputation rating. These
rating come mainly from the users. If the request con-
tacts a known address with a good reputation, we for-
bid the application under test to reach it, then it is
redirected to Inetsim. The advantages are twofold.
The application cannot damage a respectable website,
and it pre-filters behaviors for classification.
Finally features from communications content are collected
and the WoT reputation scores as well. A sample of a net-
work capture is shown in the annexes.
3.3 Automated Application Testing
Smart Monkey is an automated testing program based on
Grey Box strategies. The context of the application is de-
termined at runtime for the automatic exploration. We use
UIautomator [32], a tool that can dump the hierarchy tree
of the current UI elements present on screen. It enable us to
monitor variables of each UI element at runtime. For a smart
exploration, we need to know if we have already processed
an element. Unfortunately, elements do not carry such an
unique identifier. Nonetheless, we found that elements can
be identified to some degree:
• Strong identification - Elements can have an asso-
ciated ID string that developers set. Concatenated to
the current activity name we have robust identifica-
tion, but for most of the elements this field is empty.
With the same method, a content description is some-
times associated with the element. We can also use
this for strong identification.
• Partial identification - If we do not have access to
previous values, which happens most of the times, we
can use lesser discriminative values. Textfields can be
set with an initial value, or a printed text can be asso-
ciated to it. With no better available options we use
the element dimensions to identify it. Obviously, when
an element is partially identified, a risk of false positive
is possible.
Moreover each element carries a list of actions it can trig-
ger. Our automatic exploration consists of systematically
triggering all actions of all elements for all activities. We do
not try each combination of actions as it would not scale and
be mostly redundant. To this basic general process we add
targeted actions to trigger more sophisticated behaviors:
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• Some textfields of interest are detected like phone num-
ber, first or last name, email address, IBAN, country,
city, street addresses, password or pin code. These
textfields are filled with consistent values accordingly.
For this task, we use databases of realistic data (sam-
ples can be found in the annexes). Uncategorised textfields
are filled with a pseudo-random string.
• The order of actions done matters. For example login
and password textfields must be filled before validat-
ing. In the exploration, filling textfields and check-
boxes takes precedence over the rest.
• An application can register a receiver for a broadcast
Android event like the change of phone state or wifi
state. It can be done statically in the application man-
ifest or dynamically. Those dynamical receivers could
be hidden from static analysis with obfuscation. To
trigger the receivers code, we test applications with a
list of broadcast events that are often used by malware
(a partial list is given in annexes). Moreover, real SMS
and phone calls are sent to the real device own number.
We finally use the Monkey [21] program during the analysis.
It can help to trigger behaviors requiring complex inputs
combination that Smart Monkey could miss. At the end
comes the cleaning phase. For our real device we keep a
white list of regular processes and installed applications -
regular, system and device administrator applications. Non-
authorised processes are killed and applications uninstalled.
Important phone configurations like wifi, data network and
sounds are reset to a predefined value.
4. DISCUSSION
Toward the standardization of the evaluation of au-
tomated testing methods for Android.
Research community used different strategies for auto-
mated application testing, with different evaluation methods
and different datasets. To promote the successful strategies
for future researches on the domain, we need a standard for
the experimentation. Otherwise, we cannot compare the re-
sults objectively. The research titled Automated Test Input
Generation for Android: Are We There Yet? [33] shows the
re-evaluation on the same ground of 5 published automated
testing tools for Android. The experimental results found is
far from what have been claimed in the published papers.
Moreover, according to this study Monkey program have the
best performances above all at around 53% average coverage
of statements on 68 selected applications. It could question
the contribution of the main researches papers to the field.
However, we believe the evaluation method lacks pertinence.
To summarize, these observations reveal several problems
on the experimental results:
• (1) They are currently not reproductible.
• (2) They cannot be compared to each other.
• (3) They do not hightlight the contribution of the tested
tool compared to Monkey program.
To answer those problems, we propose the following rules:
• (2) A common performance measure. We pro-
pose the average coverage of basic blocks (this measure
is described in the Experimentation part). Statement
coverage (also called line coverage) is considered as the
weakest code coverage measure by specialists in soft-
ware testing. This metric should not be used when an-
other one is available. For an argued reflection about
coverage metrics, we refer to the paper What is Wrong
with Statement Coverage [34].
• (1)(2) A common dataset and common tools for
instrumenting the applications. We propose the An-
droCoverage Dataset [3].
• (1)(2) A common configuration - Monkey argu-
ments, a fixed seed for every random number gener-
ator used and application versions. These information
are either present in annexes of this document or on
the AndroCoverage Github web page.
• (3) To assess the performance of the combination of
both Monkey and the evaluated tool. Comparing sep-
arately, the performance of Monkey and the tested tool
does not hightlight new code paths that have been
triggered by the evaluated tool. A complex method
would not seem successful whereas it would have trig-
gered complex conditions that Monkey could never
find. Moreover, the Monkey program is embeded in
every Android device (real and virtual), it interacts in
a very fast pace with the application and it produces
good results. Then, on an operational situation, it
makes sense to use it in addition to any research tool.
5. EXPERIMENTATION
We use the AndroCoverage Dataset [3] for our experimen-
tation. It contains 100 applications from F-Droid, which
is a repository of free and open source (FOSS) applications.
They have been manually selected with the following criteria
for each application:
• It does not depend on a third party library or appli-
cation as an automatic tool would be unable to install
it.
• It does not depend on root privilege. To meet the re-
quirement of a maximum of testing tools configuration,
we stick with regular privilege.
• It does not depend on local or temporary remote data.
We want the application to be usable worldwide and
in the long-term. This category excludes applications
for a temporary event or a specific country.
Our goal is to use applications which show a large variety
of different and steady behaviors. It is why we predict that
performance on the AndroCoverage Dataset will be overes-
timated compared to the average of real applications. This
dataset is to be used to compare the performance of different
automated testing tools on the same ground.
The AndroCoverage Dataset is supplied with tools which
instruments the application, adding monitoring routines for
code coverage. We used them for comparing the perfor-
mance between Monkey and Smart Monkey. These tools
are partially founded on BBoxTester [35], a tool for mea-
suring the code coverage for Black Box testing of Android
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applications. Smart Monkey runs Monkey at the beginning
of the analysis. For a fair trial, we tested the performance
of its code coverage with and without Monkey. The config-
uration of the Monkey tool has been described in annexes.
The results are presented on Figure 5
The Monkey program tends to generate bugs with the in-
strumentation. For a significant amount of applications we
are unable to get the coverage rate. We note that the same
applications crash between Monkey and Smart Monkey so
the crash rate has no effect on the comparison of perfor-
mance between both programs.
For the analysis of the results, we focus mainly on the
average coverage of basic blocks, as it is the most significant
measure. Here are definitions of the vocabulary used in the
experimentation:
• A basic block is an uninterrupted or continuous section
of instructions. It means that when the first instruc-
tion of a basic block is executed, all other instructions
of the block will also be executed, only one time. A
basic block begins at the start of the program or at
the target of a control transfert instruction (JUMP/-
CALL/RETURN). It ends at the next control transfert
instruction.
• The basic block coverage for an application is the num-
ber of unique basic blocks executed at runtime divided
by the number of unique basic blocks present in the
source code.
• The average coverage of basic blocks, is the sum of the
basic block coverage of all applications divided by the
number of applications.
The results shows Monkey and Smart (Smart Monkey
without Monkey) do no trigger the same code paths. They
have approximately the same performance but their com-
bination leads to an increase of 13.52% of average coverage
of basic blocks ( smartmonkeyac
monkeyac
= 1.1352) compared to the
Monkey program only.
6. LIMITATIONS
Dynamic analysis systems that allows internet communi-
cations are vulnerable to fingerprinting. Our platform is
not an exception. For example Bouncer have been the tar-
get of remote shell attacks [36] that enabled the fingerprint-
ing of the system. The malware gets some information on
the system and sends it to a command and control server.
Hence, the malware author can reshape trigger conditions of
the logic bomb. We accepted this risk for now. A solution
halfway between shutting down all communications and no
filtering at all could be to strip all outgoing information -
POST request contents/GET url variables/Cookies/Meta-
data fields. This could lead to a loss of behaviors and the
negative impact of such solution needs to be measured. Any-
way a smart malware author will eventually find a way to
leak remote shell outputs.
The network monitoring has limitations. First, it cannot
currently handle all protocols like POP, IMAP and FTP so
these protocols are simply blocked. In fact the communi-
cations are parsed, to get its content, the destination and
the metadata. So this parsing needs to be changed for each
protocol. It is an impossible task of adding one by one all
protocols, so we would need to measure the protocol usage
and implement the most used ones. At last, there is a coun-
termeasure to our SSL/TLS interception, namely certificate
pinning. The requipement of the interception is the implan-
tation of a custom root certificate in the Android keystore
of trusted certificates. An application can choose to discard
the Android keystore and to embed its own. Therefore when
a communication, encrypted with our custom certificate, is
checked, the communication is rejected. This technique is
used in many banking applications [20]. In fact the point
of view of the bank is: the user OS cannot be trusted. Al-
though we have no evidence that it happens for malware, it
may be used by an avant-gardist malware and other would
follow the trail. It is inconvenient for malware authors to
buy a certificate signed by an authority of certification, as
a payment trace could identify them. Despite of that, it is
possible to get a valid certificate from Let’s Encrypt [37],
or to control a legtimate server via hacking and use it as a
relay for the C&C server. In these cases, certificate pinning
could be used for hiding communications from analysts or
interception systems. A counter to this technique is instru-
mentation. By monitoring arguments of the SSL/TLS en-
cryption method, one can get the plaintext communications.
We have done it manually for some banking applications [20]
with APImonitor [18], but doing it automatically is another
issue. Applications that use certificate pinning generally em-
bed their own library for SSL/TLS encryption, so detecting
dynamically which call is the SSL/TLS encryption method
can be challenging.
Last, the cleaning phase of Glassbox fits the security needed
for a prototype. However, to move to an operational situa-
tion with malware that could execute 0-day root exploits, we
need a real factory-reset of the phone. This is why we plan
to integrate the open source project BareDroid as a part of
Smart Monkey, for its factory-reset capability on real device.
7. CONCLUSION & FUTURE RESEARCH
This paper contributes to the domain of dynamic analy-
sis system for Android in three ways. First, we presented
Glassbox a functional prototype of a platform that uses real
devices, controls network and GSM communications to some
extends and monitors Java calls, systems calls and network
communication content. Second, we experimented Smart
Monkey, an automatic testing tool with a Grey Box test-
ing strategy. We showed that it enhances the application
code coverage compared to the common Black Box testing
tool called Monkey. Last, we presented a method of evalua-
tion of automated testing tools to research community. This
method covers the problems of reproducibility, the compar-
ison with other works and of the contribution measurement
of the tool. We made the dataset available on Github under
the name AndroCoverage.
The next step is to use Glassbox on malware/benign appli-
cations and to use the features found on a machine learning
algorithm. We are working on the classification of these data
with a neural network.
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Figure 5: Code coverage results.
Method Classes average coverage Methods average coverage Blocks average coverage Crash rate
Monkey 32.93% 35.05% 36.32% 16%
Smart 34.84% 36.68% 37.73% 0%
Smart Monkey 37.12% 41.6% 41.23% 16%
Annexes
Data samples used in Smart Monkey
$> head first -names.txt
Aaren
Aarika
Abagael
Abagail
Abbe
Abbey
Abbi
Abbie
Abby
Abbye
$> head random -iban.txt
AL94283405797977629281563659
AL60726122350056756457999447
AL23793884960503665784521815
AL91081264763546250859672884
AL11092882957032338172366593
AL40934720875931425549598788
AL13434083187544897640510833
AL04316725870884613781699580
AL79290673310301480830031517
AL97147262313758527061137496
$> head broadcast -events.txt
android.intent.action.BOOT_COMPLETED
android.intent.action.BATTERY_CHANGED
android.net.conn.CONNECTIVITY_CHANGE
android.intent.action.USER_PRESENT
android.intent.action.
ACTION_POWER_CONNECTED
android.intent.action.
ACTION_POWER_DISCONNECTED
android.intent.action.INPUT_METHOD_CHANGED
android.bluetooth.device.action.
ACL_CONNECTED
android.bluetooth.device.action.
ACL_DISCONNECTED
android.intent.action.GTALK_CONNECTED
Emails are a combination of first and last name with a
well known email provider (gmail, yahoo etc.)
Sample of a Java calls capture
$> logcat
[...]
void java.lang.StringBuilder.<init >
java.lang.StringBuilder java.lang.
StringBuilder.append
java.lang.StringBuilder java.lang.
StringBuilder.append
java.lang.String java.lang.StringBuilder.
toString
void com.energysource.szj.android.Log.i
android.os.Looper android.os.Looper.
getMainLooper
void android.os.Handler.<init >
android.os.Message android.os.Message.
obtain
boolean android.os.Handler.
sendMessageDelayed
void android.view.ViewGroup.
onAttachedToWindow
void android.view.View.
onWindowVisibilityChanged
void com.energysource.szj.embeded.AdView.
updateRunning
void android.os.Handler.removeMessages
void java.lang.StringBuilder.<init >
java.lang.StringBuilder java.lang.
StringBuilder.append
int android.view.View.getId
java.lang.StringBuilder java.lang.
StringBuilder.append
java.lang.StringBuilder java.lang.
StringBuilder.append
java.lang.String java.lang.StringBuilder.
toString
[...]
Sample of a network capture
[...]
<header >
<method >R0VU </method >
<scheme >aHR0cA ==</scheme >
<host >MTE1LjE4Mi4zMC42OA ==</host >
<port >ODA=</port >
<path >L0dldEluZm8uYXNoeD9hcHBpZD03Z
mZjN2JlOTJmM2M0YTdmYTA4MzUxZTNkNT
NmOThkYSZhcHB2ZXI9Mjc2JnY9MS4wLjQ
mY2xpZW50PTImcG49Y29tLmdwLnNlYXJj
aCZ1c2VydmVyPTIuMCZhZHR5cGU9MiZjb
3VudHJ5PWZyJm50PTImbW5vPTIwODE1Jn
V1aWQ9ZmZmZmZmZmYtZWIwOS05NDcwLTU
zY2UtYmMxYjAwMDAwMDAwJm9zPTYuMC4x
JmRuPUFPU1Arb24rSGFtbWVySGVhZCZza
XplPTEwODAqMTc3NiZjYz00JmNtPTM4Lj
QwJnJhbT0xODk5NTA4a2I=
</path >
<http_version >
SFRUUC8xLjE=
</http_version >
<host >Y2ZnLmFkc21vZ28uY29t </host >
<Connection >
S2VlcC1BbGl2ZQ ==
</Connection >
<User -Agent >
QXBhY2hlLUh0dHBDbGllbnQvVU5BVkFJT
EFCTEUgKGphdmEgMS40KQ ==
</User -Agent >
</header >
<content />
[...]
NB: all field values are encoded in base 64
9
Monkey configuration
monkey -s 0 --pct -syskeys 0 --pct -
appswitch 0 --throttle 50 -p <
package -name > -v 500
-s 0: The seed of the random number
generator is fixed to 0
--pct -syskeys 0: No system key events
are sent , such as Home , Back , Start
Call , End Call , or Volume inputs.
--pct -appswitch 0: No startActivity ()
are issued as calling the
instrumentation activity another
time breaks it.
--throttle 50: The delay between events
is fixed to 50 milliseconds.
500: A total of 500 events are sent.
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